Case Law

ForRealz

Well-Known Member
If you present a case where something was Dropped, Overturned or Dismissed, is there any less Precedent? No, Precedent is Precedent.
Actually, brother, if a case is dropped/dismissed then there is no "precedent" b/c for there to be "case law / judicial precedent" then there has to be (1) an opinion of the Court, And (2) that opinion has to be filed.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Actually, brother, if a case is dropped/dismissed then there is no "precedent" b/c for there to be "case law / judicial precedent" then there has to be (1) an opinion of the Court, And (2) that opinion has to be filed.
Not true. Even if there was just 1 other person arrested along side you, and their case was dropped. That is precedent and will effect the decision of your judge.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
haha. I've been known to put plants thru a lot of stress. i can't help but wonder what happens to them suckers under a varied stress. plus, like u said, when creating a strain, you must know which ones will hermaph, auto flower, or whatever else kind of response they may have. In general, I'm probably a better breeder than grower. I think epidemics is an interesting topic.
If no one ever stressed a plant (Killing the males stresses the Females), then we wouldn't have Sensimilla.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
And I understand why a local or State or Federal Lawyer may be Concerned with the Semantics of Overturned, Dismissed and Dropped, but that is because they are watching local cases. I'm more worried about what the Supreme Court has to say about all of us. And I always use Rule 5.1, which asks the question not did you or didn't you, but was it Constitutional to do something at all.

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/544/03-9877/index.pdf

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/520/case.html

Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal546 U.S. 418 (2006)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/546/04-1084/index.pdf

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States143 U.S. 457 (1892)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/143/457/case.html

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. ___ (2014)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf

Sherbert v. Verner374 U.S. 398 (1963)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/case.html

Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div.450 U.S. 707 (1981)
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/450/707/case.html
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
It's like Habeas Corpus, it's not about the case the prosecutor wants to make, it's about the evidence and the merits.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Some History of the Black Panther Party
In the 1960s Huey Newton, a leader of the Black Panther Party, shot and killed a Police officer. He was convicted of Voluntary Manslaughter and appealed until he got to the California Supreme Court. He said that he was shot first (and he was, in the stomach) and blacked out. The Supreme Court of California dropped all charges because the prosecutor and even his own attorney never told a jury that he blacked out, which would mean that it was not Voluntary, and he wasn't getting a fair trial. Later the Chicago DA in cooperation with the FBI assassinated Fred Hampton (another leader of the Party). The FBI claimed there was a gun battle (later the court discovered there wasn't), and it took 20 years to go through the court.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
People v. Newton (1970)
Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973)
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
Uttecht v. Brown 551 U.S. 1 (2007)

"It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which, in truth, is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation."

In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216, we phrased the rule in broader terms:

"Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103. "


"We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." Ch. 40 of the 1215 Magna Carta, a portion of ch. 29 of the 1225 reissue. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-24 (1967).

The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor, but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted, but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts."

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).

It violates the Equal Protection Clause to exclude African Americans from grand and petit juries, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), whether defendant is or is not an African American, Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and exclusion of potential jurors because of their national ancestry is unconstitutional, at least where defendant is of that ancestry as well, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).

In the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court has permitted any defendant to challenge the arbitrary exclusion from jury service of his own or any other class. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-87 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), male defendants were permitted to challenge the exclusion of women as a Sixth Amendment violation. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953). In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), and Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948), the Court in 5-to-4 decisions upheld state use of "blue ribbon" juries from which particular groups, such as laborers and women, had been excluded.

Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-American defendant successfully made out prima facie case of intentional exclusion of persons of his ethnic background by showing a substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans based on a comparison of the group's proportion in the total population of eligible jurors to the proportion called, and this in the face of the fact that Mexican-Americans controlled the selection process).
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (attempted bribe of a juror reported by him to authorities); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (during trial one of the jurors had been actively seeking employment in the District Attorney's office).

E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Exposure of the jurors to knowledge about the defendant's prior criminal record and activities is not alone sufficient to establish a presumption of reversible prejudice, but on voir dire jurors should be questioned about their ability to judge impartially. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). The Court indicated that under the same circumstances in a federal trial it would have overturned the conviction pursuant to its supervisory power. Id. at 797-98, citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Essentially, the defendant must make a showing of prejudice which the court then may inquire into. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575, 581 (1981); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-18 (1982); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (placing jury in charge of two deputy sheriffs who were principal prosecution witnesses at defendant's jury trial denied him his right to an impartial jury); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (influence on jury by prejudiced bailiff). Cf. Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 (1972).

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (felony); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (misdemeanor). Important factors to be considered, however, include the size and characteristics of the community in which the crime occurred; whether the publicity was blatantly prejudicial; the time elapsed between the publicity and the trial; and whether the jurors' verdict supported the theory of prejudice. Skilling v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968). The Witherspoon case was given added significance when in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the Court held mandatory death sentences unconstitutional and ruled that the jury as a representative of community mores must make the determination as guided by legislative standards. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (holding Witherspoon applicable to bifurcated capital sentencing procedures and voiding a statute permitting exclusion of any juror unable to swear that the existence of the death penalty would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact)
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Look at the COINTELPRO documents, the FBI was literally in their own words afraid of a Messiah or at least must stop the Messiah.
 

WeedFreak78

Well-Known Member
haha. I've been known to put plants thru a lot of stress. i can't help but wonder what happens to them suckers under a varied stress. plus, like u said, when creating a strain, you must know which ones will hermaph, auto flower, or whatever else kind of response they may have. In general, I'm probably a better breeder than grower. I think epidemics is an interesting topic.
Typhus or plague?
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Written Law is the least important kind of Law, that is the point of this thread, everyone should just know that. For example, In re Neagle, even in cases of Murder, doing the act Pursuant to the Constitution, or Precedent, you didn't break the law.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
That's why cops can shoot people and get away with it if they felt like they were at risk of loosing their lives. And why the Supreme Court has Marshalls now. Both come from In re Neagle.
 

Finshaggy

Well-Known Member
Case Law = The Constitution and Written Law applied together in a court.
If you read enough case law, you probably wouldn't even need to read the Constitution, which would be better than we are now, because most people either focus on Written Law or the Constitution.
 
Top