Sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining nukes.

abandonconflict

Well-Known Member
By the time Obama was elected, the war in Iraq had shifted focus completely to forces loyal to Tehran. The Mahdi Army was carrying out mass murder against Sunni civilians and it sure felt like Iraq was a proxy for Iran. By the end of Obama's presidency the groundwork was laid for a deal to keep Iran from building nukes and China, Russia and the EU were supporting it. The UN verified repeatedly that Iran was holding up its end. Obama warned that pulling out of the deal would lead to war.

Trump pulled out of the deal. Now he is imposing sanctions, apparently to keep Iran from building nukes. Every day that he remains president damages US national interests. We can't wait until the election to get back on the right track.
 

Moses Mobetta

Well-Known Member
I still remember the hostages from the 70s. We have had a lot of trouble with Iran over the years and it shows no sign of changing. I met a couple from there who were refugees we helped them. They had some intense stories to tell. Fuck Iran.
 

abandonconflict

Well-Known Member
I still remember the hostages from the 70s. We have had a lot of trouble with Iran over the years and it shows no sign of changing. I met a couple from there who were refugees we helped them. They had some intense stories to tell. Fuck Iran.
Fuck two thirds of humanity, at least.

Doesn't mean that we're better off having scrapped a nuke deal that was working peacefully in favor of war.
 

medviper

Well-Known Member
Iran has a reason for their hatred, hostility and mistrust of the US.
besides blowing a commercial passenger flight out of sky in 1988.
i almost forgot about it myself...sometimes it's difficult to wrap yourself in the flag when one thinks about American meddling of the distant & recent past.
not defending or condoning current Iranian international or domestic policies, but the history must be taken in perspective to understand the current situation.

washingtonpost.com
The forgotten story of Iran Air Flight 655
By Max Fisher October 16, 2013
5-6 minutes

Iranian children throw flowers into the sea as part of a 24th anniversary commemoration of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655. (Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

If you walked into any high school classroom in the United States and asked the students to describe their country's relationship with Iran, you'd probably hear words like "enemy" and "threat," maybe "distrust" and "nuclear." But ask them what the number 655 has to do with it, and you'd be met with silence.

Try the same thing in an Iranian classroom, asking about the United States, and you'd probably hear some of the same words. Mention the number 655, though, it's a safe bet that at least a few of the students would immediately know what you were talking about.

The number, 655, is a flight number: Iran Air 655. If you've never heard of it, you're far from alone. But you should know the story if you want to better understand why the United States and Iran so badly distrust one another and why it will be so difficult to strike a nuclear deal, as they're attempting to do at a summit in Switzerland this week.

The story of Iran Air 655 begins, like so much of the U.S.-Iran struggle, with the 1979 Islamic revolution. When Iraq invaded Iran the following year, the United States supported Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein against the two countries' mutual Iranian enemy. The war dragged on for eight awful years, claiming perhaps a million lives.

Toward the end of the war, on July 3, 1988, a U.S. Navy ship called the Vincennes was exchanging fire with small Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy kept ships there, and still does, to protect oil trade routes. As the American and Iranian ships skirmished, Iran Air Flight 655 took off from nearby Bandar Abbas International Airport, bound for Dubai. The airport was used by both civilian and military aircraft. The Vincennes mistook the lumbering Airbus A300 civilian airliner for a much smaller and faster F-14 fighter jet, perhaps in the heat of battle or perhaps because the flight allegedly did not identify itself. It fired two surface-to-air missiles, killing all 290 passengers and crew members on board.

The horrible incident brought Tehran closer to ending the war, but its effects have lingered much longer than that. "The shoot-down of Iran Air flight 655 was an accident, but that is not how it was seen in Tehran," former CIA analyst and current Brookings scholar Kenneth Pollack wrote in his 2004 history of U.S.-Iran enmity, "The Persian Puzzle." "The Iranian government assumed that the attack had been purposeful. ... Tehran convinced itself that Washington was trying to signal that the United States had decided to openly enter the war on Iraq's side."

That belief, along with Iraq's increased use of chemical weapons against Iran, led Tehran to accept a United Nations cease-fire two months later. But it also helped cement a view in Iran, still common among hard-liners in the government, that the United States is absolutely committed to the destruction of the Islamic Republic and will stop at almost nothing to accomplish this. It is, as Time's Michael Crowley points out in an important piece, one of several reasons that Iran has a hard time believing it can trust the United States to ever stop short of its complete destruction.

This is not just an issue of historical grievance: It matters in immediate geopolitical terms to the efforts by President Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to find their way to a nuclear deal and perhaps a first step toward detente. For any deal to work, both countries will have to trust that the other is sincere about its willingness to follow through on its promises. For the United States, that means trusting that Iran is really willing to give up any nuclear weapons ambitions and ramp down the program as promised (Washington has real, legitimate grounds to worry about this; Iran has its own history of misdeeds). For Iran, it means trusting that the United States will actually accept the Islamic Republic and coexist peacefully with it.

The eight-year war with Iraq, which is widely seen in Iran as a war against not just Hussein but his Western backers, and the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 that came near its conclusion, have convinced many in Iran that the United States simply cannot be trusted to let Iran be. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Rouhani's boss, often appears to share this deep distrust. Khamenei and other hard-liners could scuttle any deal; a similar drama will likely play out in Washington.

If Iran believes that the United States is so committed to its destruction that it would willingly shoot down a plane full of Iranian civilians, then Tehran has every incentive to assume we're lying in negotiations. It also has strong incentives to try to build a nuclear weapon, or at least get close enough to deter the American invasion that it feared was coming in 1988 and perhaps again in 2002 with President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" speech.

Americans might not know about Flight 655. But Iranians surely do -- they can hardly forget about it.
 

medviper

Well-Known Member
britannica.com
Iranian Revolution | Causes, Effects, & Facts
Written By: Janet Afary See Article History

10-12 minutes


Iranian Revolution, also called Islamic Revolution, Persian Enqelāb-e Eslāmī, popular uprising in Iran in 1978–79 that resulted in the toppling of the monarchy on February 11, 1979, and led to the establishment of an Islamic republic.







Read More on This Topic

Iran: The Iranian Revolution, 1978–79

Outwardly, with a swiftly expanding economy and a rapidly modernizing infrastructure, everything was going well in Iran. But in little more…

Prelude to revolution
The 1979 revolution, which brought together Iranians across many different social groups, has its roots in Iran’s long history. These groups, which included clergy, landowners, intellectuals, and merchants, had previously come together in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11. Efforts toward satisfactory reform were continually stifled, however, amid reemerging social tensions as well as foreign intervention from Russia, the United Kingdom, and, later, the United States. The United Kingdom helped Reza Shah Pahlavi establish a monarchy in 1921. Along with Russia, the U.K. then pushed Reza Shah into exile in 1941, and his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took the throne. In 1953, as Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq nationalized British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil (see British Petroleum Company PLC) and his supporters ousted Mohammad Reza Shah, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.K. Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) orchestrated a coup against Mosaddeq’s government and restored the shah.

Years later, Mohammad Reza Shah dimissed the parliament and launched the White Revolution—an aggressive modernization program that upended the wealth and influence of landowners and clerics, disrupted rural economies, led to rapid urbanization and Westernization, and prompted concerns over democracy and human rights. The program was economically successful, but the benefits were not distributed evenly, though the transformative effects on social norms and institutions were widely felt. Opposition to the shah’s policies were accentuated in the 1970s, when world monetary instability and fluctuations in Western oil consumption seriously threatened the country’s economy, still directed in large part toward high-cost projects and programs. A decade of extraordinary economic growth, heavy government spending, and a boom in oil prices led to high rates of inflation and the stagnation of Iranians’ buying power and standard of living.

In addition to mounting economic difficulties, sociopolitical repression by the shah’s regime increased in the 1970s. Outlets for political participation were minimal, and opposition parties such as the National Front (a loose coalition of nationalists, clerics, and noncommunist left-wing parties) and the pro-Soviet Tūdeh (“Masses”) Party were marginalized or outlawed. Social and political protest was often met with censorship, surveillance, or harassment, and illegal detention and torture were common.


For the first time in more than half a century, the secular intellectuals—many of whom were fascinated by the populist appeal of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a former professor of philosophy in Qom who had been exiled in 1964 after speaking out harshly against the shah’s recent reform program—abandoned their aim of reducing the authority and power of the Shīʿite ulama (religious scholars) and argued that, with the help of the ulama, the shah could be overthrown.

In this environment, members of the National Front, the Tūdeh Party, and their various splinter groups now joined the ulama in broad opposition to the shah’s regime. Khomeini continued to preach in exile about the evils of the Pahlavi regime, accusing the shah of irreligion and subservience to foreign powers. Thousands of tapes and print copies of Khomeini’s speeches were smuggled back into Iran during the 1970s as an increasing number of unemployed and working-poor Iranians—mostly new migrants from the countryside, who were disenchanted by the cultural vacuum of modern urban Iran—turned to the ulama for guidance. The shah’s dependence on the United States, his close ties with Israel—then engaged in extended hostilities with the overwhelmingly Muslim Arab states—and his regime’s ill-considered economic policies served to fuel the potency of dissident rhetoric with the masses.

Outwardly, with a swiftly expanding economy and a rapidly modernizing infrastructure, everything was going well in Iran. But in little more than a generation, Iran had changed from a traditional, conservative, and rural society to one that was industrial, modern, and urban. The sense that in both agriculture and industry too much had been attempted too soon and that the government, either through corruption or incompetence, had failed to deliver all that was promised was manifested in demonstrations against the regime in 1978.
 

medviper

Well-Known Member
Revolution

In January 1978, incensed by what they considered to be slanderous remarks made against Khomeini in Eṭṭelāʿāt, a Tehrān newspaper, thousands of young madrasah (religious school) students took to the streets. They were followed by thousands more Iranian youth—mostly unemployed recent immigrants from the countryside—who began protesting the regime’s excesses. The shah, weakened by cancer and stunned by the sudden outpouring of hostility against him, vacillated between concession and repression, assuming the protests to be part of an international conspiracy against him. Many people were killed by government forces in anti-regime protests, serving only to fuel the violence in a Shīʿite country where martyrdom played a fundamental role in religious expression. Fatalities were followed by demonstrations to commemorate the customary 40-day milestone of mourning in Shīʿite tradition, and further casualties occurred at those protests, mortality and protest propelling one another forward. Thus, in spite of all government efforts, a cycle of violence began in which each death fueled further protest, and all protest—from the secular left and religious right—was subsumed under the cloak of Shīʿite Islam and crowned by the revolutionary rallying cry Allāhu akbar (“God is great”), which could be heard at protests and which issued from the rooftops in the evenings.

The violence and disorder continued to escalate. On September 8 the regime imposed martial law, and troops opened fire against demonstrators in Tehrān, killing dozens or hundreds. Weeks later, government workers began to strike. On October 31, oil workers also went on strike, bringing the oil industry to a halt. Demonstrations continued to grow; on December 10, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Tehrān alone.

During his exile, Khomeini coordinated this upsurge of opposition—first from Iraq and after 1978 from France—demanding the shah’s abdication. In January 1979, in what was officially described as a “vacation,” the shah and his family fled Iran. The Regency Council established to run the country during the shah’s absence proved unable to function, and Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, hastily appointed by the shah before his departure, was incapable of effecting compromise with either his former National Front colleagues or Khomeini. Crowds in excess of one million demonstrated in Tehrān, proving the wide appeal of Khomeini, who arrived in Iran amid wild rejoicing on February 1. Ten days later, on February 11, Iran’s armed forces declared their neutrality, effectively ousting the shah’s regime. Bakhtiar went into hiding, eventually to find exile in France.

Aftermath
On April 1, following overwhelming support in a national referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic republic. Elements within the clergy promptly moved to exclude their former left-wing, nationalist, and intellectual allies from any positions of power in the new regime, and a return to conservative social values was enforced. The Family Protection Act (1967; significantly amended in 1975), which provided further guarantees and rights to women in marriage, was declared void, and mosque-based revolutionary bands known as komītehs (Persian: “committees”) patrolled the streets enforcing Islamic codes of dress and behaviour and dispatching impromptu justice to perceived enemies of the revolution. Throughout most of 1979 the Revolutionary Guards—then an informal religious militia formed by Khomeini to forestall another CIA-backed coup as in the days of Mosaddeq—engaged in similar activity, aimed at intimidating and repressing political groups not under control of the ruling Revolutionary Council and its sister Islamic Republican Party, both clerical organizations loyal to Khomeini. The violence and brutality often exceeded that which had taken place under the shah.

The militias and the clerics they supported made every effort to suppress Western cultural influence, and, facing persecution and violence, many of the Western-educated elite fled the country. This anti-Western sentiment eventually manifested itself in the November 1979 seizure of 66 hostages at the U.S. embassy by a group of Iranian protesters demanding the extradition of the shah, who at that time was undergoing medical treatment in the United States (see Iran hostage crisis). Through the embassy takeover, Khomeini’s supporters could claim to be as “anti-imperialist” as the political left. This ultimately gave them the ability to suppress most of the regime’s left-wing and moderate opponents.

The Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregān), overwhelmingly dominated by clergy, put a new constitution to referendum the following month, and it was overwhelmingly approved. The new constitution created a religious government based on Khomeini’s vision of velāyat-e faqīh (Persian: “governance of the jurist”) and gave sweeping powers to the rahbar, or leader; the first rahbar was Khomeini himself. Moderates, such as provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the republic’s first president, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who opposed holding the hostages, were steadily forced from power by conservatives within the government who questioned their revolutionary zeal.

Janet Afary The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
 

medviper

Well-Known Member
Fuck two thirds of humanity, at least.

Doesn't mean that we're better off having scrapped a nuke deal that was working peacefully in favor of war.
just another ill advised chapter of trumps predetermination and obsessiveness of undoing the Obama legacy at the risk & expense of causing global instability, so anything with Obama's name on it is a target for trump, and will continue to be as long as trump remains in office.
 

abandonconflict

Well-Known Member
would it be naive of me to say that threatening a people, nation, society, whatever, the US is causing Iran to become more prone to war?
They have even signaled as much if you'd interpret it that way.

The rest of the world still wants to make that agreement with them and they are saying they'll go way beyond what they were agreeing to in regard to the limit on production of enriched uranium.

They have been in a near constant state of proxy-war for quite a while. From the Mahdi Army to Hizbollah to the Houthi rebels and now they're conducting joint ops with Turkey against Kurdish forces. So yes, in my opinion, escalation is typically Tehran's response to anything it doesn't like.
 

Jimdamick

Well-Known Member
I still remember the hostages from the 70s
You mean the one's that were taking in the Embassy and were all released because the Iranians were sick and tired of being fucked with by the USA, and then Reagan gave Iran missiles to attack Iraq with, so they let them go?
The Iranians have been fucked with since 1958 by the USA for oil, and there's a lot of history to prove that.
When any American thinks that the Iranians are the cause of problems in the ME, they should go back to school and read the fucking history of the USA's direct actions against Iran for over 60 fucking years.
So, when they chant "Death to America" I can totally understand where their coming from, because we, the USA, created this situation.
 
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Unclebaldrick

Well-Known Member
would it be naive of me to say that threatening a people, nation, society, whatever, the US is causing Iran to become more prone to war?
I think that pretty much nails it. Iran is a country with a strong antipathy (deserved) to the US. It is also on the brink of moving past it and depriving us of our useful enemy in the region since Hussein's exit.

It is quite shameful that we are going this way and strengthening the hand of those factions in Iran who are hostile to us. This seems that be part of Trump's pattern.

It used to be that the goal of international relations was to serve the country's interests - in theory at least. Trump is brazenly serving his own interests and 40% of Americans have no idea. Historically, that is pretty much par for the course for us. 40% is around the number of Americans who have no idea what the word is like outside their own county.
 

hotrodharley

Well-Known Member
"Let's make Iran Great Again"

Donald Trump actually said this.
He’s nuttier than a Christmas fruitcake. Literally everything in his head revolves around money and especially development. He was picturing developing beach resorts in North Korea. He publicly stated it. Every situation he has to make some statement as to the money-making potential therein. At the same time he is completely oblivious to reality.
 

hotrodharley

Well-Known Member
By the way - fuck Israel. 100% fuck that country. Founded by terrorists (literal actual terrorists) and secular Zionists. The USA complicit in painting any criticism of the dump as “anti-Semitism” thus immediately nullifying any comment that isn’t pro-Israel. The country was founded on terror as the West quickly caved and by 1948 the fix was in. Handily utilizing the outrage raised by WWII to establish a country that has utilized every aspect of Nazism to exploit the Palestinians.
 

abandonconflict

Well-Known Member
I think that pretty much nails it. Iran is a country with a strong antipathy (deserved) to the US. It is also on the brink of moving past it and depriving us of our useful enemy in the region since Hussein's exit.

It is quite shameful that we are going this way and strengthening the hand of those factions in Iran who are hostile to us. This seems that be part of Trump's pattern.

It used to be that the goal of international relations was to serve the country's interests - in theory at least. Trump is brazenly serving his own interests and 40% of Americans have no idea. Historically, that is pretty much par for the course for us. 40% is around the number of Americans who have no idea what the word is like outside their own county.
According to State Department data, 36% of US citizens hold a vaild passport.
 
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