drstrangebud
Member
The Supreme Court just ruled on the Jardines v Florida caseand I must say Im surprised and very pleased. Anyway they ruled in favor ofJardines and the police cant come to your door or on your property with a drugdetection dog without a warrant. Here istheir decision.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeownersporch to investigate the contents of the home is a "search" withinthe meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I
In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade PoliceDepartment received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in thehome of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and theDrug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines'[*2]home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home forfifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around thehome, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn. Detective Pedrajathen approached Jardines' home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, atrained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffingdog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, andseveral other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances throughparticular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.
Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing inpart to the dog's "wild" nature, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, andtendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approachedJardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had beentrained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongestpoint source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog "begantracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and forth," engaging inwhat is called "bracketing," "back and forth, back andforth." Id., at A-33 to A-34. Detective Bartelt gave the dog "thefull six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could] givehim" to do this he testified that he needed to give the dog "asmuch distance as I can." Id., at A-35. And Detective Pedraja stood backwhile this was occurring, so that he would not "get knocked over"when the dog was "spinning around trying to find" the source. Id., atA-38.
After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat,which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor's strongest point.Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to hisvehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there hadbeen a positive alert for narcotics.
On the basis of what he had learned at the home, DetectivePedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When thewarrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and wasarrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged withtrafficking in cannabis.
At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants onthe ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trialcourt granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appealreversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Courtquashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved thetrial court's decision to suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use ofthe trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines' home was a Fourth Amendmentsearch unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based uponinformation gathered in that search. 73 So. 3d 34 (2011).
We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whetherthe officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.565 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects, [*3]against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not beviolated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for muchof our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "theGovernment obtains information by physically intruding" on persons,houses, papers, or effects, "a `search' within the original meaning of theFourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v.Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2012) (slip op., at 6, n. 3). By reason of ourdecision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), property rights"are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v.Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64 (1992) but though Katz may add to the baseline,it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when theGovernment does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protectedarea," United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,concurring in the judgment).
That principle renders this case a straightforward one. Theofficers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines andimmediately surrounding his house in the curtilage of the house, which wehave held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered thatinformation by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conductnot explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.
A
The Fourth Amendment "indicates with some precision theplaces and things encompassed by its protections": persons, houses,papers, and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176 (1984). TheFourth Amendment does not, therefore, prevent all investigations conducted onprivate property; for example, an officer may (subject to Katz) gatherinformation in what we have called "open fields" even if thosefields are privately owned because such fields are not enumerated in theAmendment's text. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924).
But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is firstamong equals. At the Amendment's "very core" stands "the rightof a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmentalintrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). Thisright would be of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in ahome's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right toretreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man'sproperty to observe his repose from just outside the front window.
We therefore regard the area "immediately surroundingand associated with the home" what our cases call the curtilage as"part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver,supra, at 180. That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as thedistinction between the home and the open fields is "as old as the commonlaw," Hester, supra, at 59, so too is the identity of home and whatBlackstone called the "curtilage or homestall," for the "houseprotects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants." 4 W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 223, 225 (1769). This areaaround the home is "intimately linked to the home, both physically andpsychologically," and is where "privacy expectations are most [*4]heightened."California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986).
While the boundaries of the curtilage are generally"clearly marked," the "conception defining the curtilage"is at any rate familiar enough that it is "easily understood from ourdaily experience." Oliver, 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12. Here there is nodoubt that the officers entered it: The front porch is the classic exemplar ofan area adjacent to the home and "to which the activity of home lifeextends." Ibid.
B
Since the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionallyprotected area, we turn to the question of whether it was accomplished throughan unlicensed physical intrusion.[fn1] While law enforcement officers need not"shield their eyes" when passing by the home "on public thoroughfares,"Ciraolo, 476 U. S., at 213, an officer's leave to gather information is sharplycircumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the FourthAmendment's protected areas. In permitting, for example, visual observation ofthe home from "public navigable airspace," we were careful to notethat it was done "in a physically nonintrusive manner." Ibid. Entickv. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765), a case"undoubtedly familiar" to "every American statesman" at thetime of the Founding, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886), statesthe general rule clearly: "[O]ur law holds the property of every man sosacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without hisleave." 2 Wils. K. B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputedthat the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of theircompanion's firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension ofJardines' home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (evenimplicitly) for them to do so. He had not.
"A license may be implied from the habits of thecountry," notwithstanding the "strict rule of the English common lawas to entry upon a close." McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127, 136 (1922)(Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on thefront door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry,justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of allkinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626 (1951). This implicitlicense typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path,knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation tolinger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitationdoes not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed withoutincident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.[fn2] Thus, a policeofficer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, preciselybecause that is "no more than any private citizen might do." Kentuckyv. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16).
But introducing a trained police dog to explore the areaaround the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is somethingelse. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage incanine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act ofhanging a knocker.[fn3] To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (evenif sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor [*5]exploring the front pathwith a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before sayinghello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to well, call thepolice. The scope of a license express or implied is limited not only to aparticular area but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to anofficer's checking out an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk doesnot permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics. Here, thebackground social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invitehim there to conduct a search.[fn4]
The State points to our decisions holding that thesubjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___ (2011); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996). But those casesmerely hold that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is notvitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop orsearch has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant willnot be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer's realreason for the stop was racial harassment. See id., at 810, 813. Here, however,the question before the court is precely whether the officer's conduct was anobjectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whetherthe officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn dependsupon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectivelyreveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think hehad license to do.
III
The State argues that investigation by a forensic narcoticsdog by definition cannot implicate any legitimate privacy interest. The Statecites for authority our decisions in United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696(1983), United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984), and Illinois v.Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), which held, respectively, that canineinspection of luggage in an airport, chemical testing of a substance that hadfallen from a parcel in transit, and canine inspection of an automobile duringa lawful traffic stop, do not violate the "reasonable expectation ofprivacy" described in Katz.
Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this.Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mountedGPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katzstandard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had"no `reasonable expectation of privacy'" in his whereabouts on the publicroads, Jones, 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) a proposition with at leastas much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g.,United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 278 (1983). But because the GPSreceiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thusintruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle'smovements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise orfall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5).The Katz reasonable-expectations test "has been added to, not substitutedfor," the traditional property-based understanding of the FourthAmendment, and so is unnecessary [*6]to consider when the government gainsevidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones,supra, at ___ (slip op., at
.
Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigationof Jardines' home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue ofthe Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy caseseasy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intrudingon Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a searchoccurred.
For a related reason we find irrelevant the State's argument(echoed by the dissent) that forensic dogs have been commonly used by policefor centuries. This argument is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v.United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), that surveillance of the home is a searchwhere "the Government uses a device that is not in general publicuse" to "explore details of the home that would previously have beenunknowable without physical intrusion." Id., at 40 (emphasis added). Butthe implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) isthat when the government uses a physical intrusion to explore details of thehome (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bringalong is irrelevant.
* * *
The government's use of trained police dogs to investigatethe home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within themeaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Floridais therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeownersporch to investigate the contents of the home is a "search" withinthe meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
I
In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade PoliceDepartment received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in thehome of respondent Joelis Jardines. One month later, the Department and theDrug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance team to Jardines'[*2]home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home forfifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around thehome, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn. Detective Pedrajathen approached Jardines' home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, atrained canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffingdog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, andseveral other drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances throughparticular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.
Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing inpart to the dog's "wild" nature, App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, andtendency to dart around erratically while searching. As the dog approachedJardines' front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had beentrained to detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongestpoint source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog "begantracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and forth," engaging inwhat is called "bracketing," "back and forth, back andforth." Id., at A-33 to A-34. Detective Bartelt gave the dog "thefull six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could] givehim" to do this he testified that he needed to give the dog "asmuch distance as I can." Id., at A-35. And Detective Pedraja stood backwhile this was occurring, so that he would not "get knocked over"when the dog was "spinning around trying to find" the source. Id., atA-38.
After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat,which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor's strongest point.Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to hisvehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there hadbeen a positive alert for narcotics.
On the basis of what he had learned at the home, DetectivePedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the residence. When thewarrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and wasarrested; the search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged withtrafficking in cannabis.
At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants onthe ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search. The trialcourt granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appealreversed. On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Supreme Courtquashed the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and approved thetrial court's decision to suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use ofthe trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines' home was a Fourth Amendmentsearch unsupported by probable cause, rendering invalid the warrant based uponinformation gathered in that search. 73 So. 3d 34 (2011).
We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whetherthe officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.565 U. S. ___ (2012).
II
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects, [*3]against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not beviolated." The Amendment establishes a simple baseline, one that for muchof our history formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When "theGovernment obtains information by physically intruding" on persons,houses, papers, or effects, "a `search' within the original meaning of theFourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred." United States v.Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3 (2012) (slip op., at 6, n. 3). By reason of ourdecision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), property rights"are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations," Soldal v.Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 64 (1992) but though Katz may add to the baseline,it does not subtract anything from the Amendment's protections "when theGovernment does engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protectedarea," United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,concurring in the judgment).
That principle renders this case a straightforward one. Theofficers were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines andimmediately surrounding his house in the curtilage of the house, which wehave held enjoys protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered thatinformation by physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conductnot explicitly or implicitly permitted by the homeowner.
A
The Fourth Amendment "indicates with some precision theplaces and things encompassed by its protections": persons, houses,papers, and effects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 176 (1984). TheFourth Amendment does not, therefore, prevent all investigations conducted onprivate property; for example, an officer may (subject to Katz) gatherinformation in what we have called "open fields" even if thosefields are privately owned because such fields are not enumerated in theAmendment's text. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924).
But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is firstamong equals. At the Amendment's "very core" stands "the rightof a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmentalintrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961). Thisright would be of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in ahome's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right toretreat would be significantly diminished if the police could enter a man'sproperty to observe his repose from just outside the front window.
We therefore regard the area "immediately surroundingand associated with the home" what our cases call the curtilage as"part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes." Oliver,supra, at 180. That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as thedistinction between the home and the open fields is "as old as the commonlaw," Hester, supra, at 59, so too is the identity of home and whatBlackstone called the "curtilage or homestall," for the "houseprotects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants." 4 W.Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 223, 225 (1769). This areaaround the home is "intimately linked to the home, both physically andpsychologically," and is where "privacy expectations are most [*4]heightened."California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986).
While the boundaries of the curtilage are generally"clearly marked," the "conception defining the curtilage"is at any rate familiar enough that it is "easily understood from ourdaily experience." Oliver, 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12. Here there is nodoubt that the officers entered it: The front porch is the classic exemplar ofan area adjacent to the home and "to which the activity of home lifeextends." Ibid.
B
Since the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionallyprotected area, we turn to the question of whether it was accomplished throughan unlicensed physical intrusion.[fn1] While law enforcement officers need not"shield their eyes" when passing by the home "on public thoroughfares,"Ciraolo, 476 U. S., at 213, an officer's leave to gather information is sharplycircumscribed when he steps off those thoroughfares and enters the FourthAmendment's protected areas. In permitting, for example, visual observation ofthe home from "public navigable airspace," we were careful to notethat it was done "in a physically nonintrusive manner." Ibid. Entickv. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765), a case"undoubtedly familiar" to "every American statesman" at thetime of the Founding, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886), statesthe general rule clearly: "[O]ur law holds the property of every man sosacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without hisleave." 2 Wils. K. B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputedthat the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of theircompanion's firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension ofJardines' home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (evenimplicitly) for them to do so. He had not.
"A license may be implied from the habits of thecountry," notwithstanding the "strict rule of the English common lawas to entry upon a close." McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127, 136 (1922)(Holmes, J.). We have accordingly recognized that "the knocker on thefront door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry,justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of allkinds." Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626 (1951). This implicitlicense typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path,knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation tolinger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that traditional invitationdoes not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed withoutincident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.[fn2] Thus, a policeofficer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, preciselybecause that is "no more than any private citizen might do." Kentuckyv. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16).
But introducing a trained police dog to explore the areaaround the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence is somethingelse. There is no customary invitation to do that. An invitation to engage incanine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act ofhanging a knocker.[fn3] To find a visitor knocking on the door is routine (evenif sometimes unwelcome); to spot that same visitor [*5]exploring the front pathwith a metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before sayinghello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to well, call thepolice. The scope of a license express or implied is limited not only to aparticular area but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to anofficer's checking out an anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk doesnot permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for narcotics. Here, thebackground social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invitehim there to conduct a search.[fn4]
The State points to our decisions holding that thesubjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___ (2011); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996). But those casesmerely hold that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is notvitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop orsearch has nothing to do with the validating reason. Thus, the defendant willnot be heard to complain that although he was speeding the officer's realreason for the stop was racial harassment. See id., at 810, 813. Here, however,the question before the court is precely whether the officer's conduct was anobjectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whetherthe officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn dependsupon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectivelyreveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think hehad license to do.
III
The State argues that investigation by a forensic narcoticsdog by definition cannot implicate any legitimate privacy interest. The Statecites for authority our decisions in United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696(1983), United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984), and Illinois v.Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), which held, respectively, that canineinspection of luggage in an airport, chemical testing of a substance that hadfallen from a parcel in transit, and canine inspection of an automobile duringa lawful traffic stop, do not violate the "reasonable expectation ofprivacy" described in Katz.
Just last Term, we considered an argument much like this.Jones held that tracking an automobile's whereabouts using a physically-mountedGPS receiver is a Fourth Amendment search. The Government argued that the Katzstandard "show[ed] that no search occurred," as the defendant had"no `reasonable expectation of privacy'" in his whereabouts on the publicroads, Jones, 565 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) a proposition with at leastas much support in our case law as the one the State marshals here. See, e.g.,United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 278 (1983). But because the GPSreceiver had been physically mounted on the defendant's automobile (thusintruding on his "effects"), we held that tracking the vehicle'smovements was a search: a person's "Fourth Amendment rights do not rise orfall with the Katz formulation." Jones, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5).The Katz reasonable-expectations test "has been added to, not substitutedfor," the traditional property-based understanding of the FourthAmendment, and so is unnecessary [*6]to consider when the government gainsevidence by physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas. Jones,supra, at ___ (slip op., at
.Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigationof Jardines' home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One virtue ofthe Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy caseseasy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intrudingon Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a searchoccurred.
For a related reason we find irrelevant the State's argument(echoed by the dissent) that forensic dogs have been commonly used by policefor centuries. This argument is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v.United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), that surveillance of the home is a searchwhere "the Government uses a device that is not in general publicuse" to "explore details of the home that would previously have beenunknowable without physical intrusion." Id., at 40 (emphasis added). Butthe implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) isthat when the government uses a physical intrusion to explore details of thehome (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bringalong is irrelevant.
* * *
The government's use of trained police dogs to investigatethe home and its immediate surroundings is a "search" within themeaning of the Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Floridais therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.