War

cannabineer

Ursus marijanus
they do have controllers that can pilot up to ten units in a swarm, i saw a video about it, maybe DIY posted it? i can't remember, but if they have shifts of 100 operators running swarms of 10 each, and as soon as they hit their targets, the next shift steps in, they could easily run nonstop until they ran out of drones.
I'm sure the Ukrainians will run clouds of smaller, cheaper, poorly armed drones to absorb AA fire first, then send in the good stuff.
I'd sure like to see that, from a safe distance.
I’m not sure the swarm is a useful feature if it’s a master/slave arrangement. Since a drone will ideally be expended on a vehicle or a tight cluster of enemy, I would think one per operator would work best. Adding automation would get very expensive, I believe.

The exception would be if a swarm could be made to loiter nearby in some safety while the operator selects and flies one after another into targets. I dunno; this is outside my knowledge.
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
What is the largest (most units) simultaneous (independently or individually guided) FPV drone attack to date? How many can be flown at once with available bandwidth?

How hard is it to provide real-time forward air control to an engaged FPV operator?
The number of units that can be operated depends on the available control and video channels. For short range control they usually use 2.4gHz for control with a couple of hundred digital channels, good out to a couple of miles depending on transmitter power. Video operates at 5.8gHz analog with around 60 standard channels and is short range too. For longer range work control is done on 900mHz with fewer channels and a standard JR module is used to convert the control radio. Likewise long-range video can operate on 1.3 gHz but antenna sizes are larger and there are only a few video channels. This is all for widely available commercial hobbyist equipment, receivers are the size of yer thumbnail and highly configurable with firmware updates.

A two-man team with a couple of dozen suicide drones could use them up pretty quickly and several teams could operate at close range at the same time. If the objective of the plan was to say devastate a few miles of Russian trench lines several layers deep they should be able to do the job along with artillery and mortars. Guys firing heavy machine guns and antitank weapons would be prime targets during an attack and it is a form of squad level micro tactical air support, actual surgical strikes.

As for forward control, these are used mostly at the small unit level, the operators are embedded with the advancing troops. Both the guys scouting and dropping bombs from regular commercial drones and the FPV suicide squad are generally in the thick of it or close by for most tactical operations.
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
What is the largest (most units) simultaneous (independently or individually guided) FPV drone attack to date? How many can be flown at once with available bandwidth?

How hard is it to provide real-time forward air control to an engaged FPV operator?
Have a peek at this, the receiver is very tiny (Dimension: 16*11*5.4mm (L*W*H) and outputs to several standard control protocols use by flight control computers, it can be changed quite a bit just with a firmware update and someone is gonna build military grade encrypted frequency shifting unit to upgrade commercial drones to military use along EW shielding packages to harden them up a bit.

Notice the other stuff on the page, like cameras and Flight computers, notice the prices.
 

cannabineer

Ursus marijanus
Have a peek at this, the receiver is very tiny (Dimension: 16*11*5.4mm (L*W*H) and outputs to several standard control protocols use by flight control computers, it can be changed quite a bit just with a firmware update and someone is gonna build military grade encrypted frequency shifting unit to upgrade commercial drones to military use along EW shielding packages to harden them up a bit.

Notice the other stuff on the page, like cameras and Flight computers, notice the prices.
I’m not seeing a link
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
I’m not sure the swarm is a useful feature if it’s a master/slave arrangement. Since a drone will ideally be expended on a vehicle or a tight cluster of enemy, I would think one per operator would work best. Adding automation would get very expensive, I believe.

The exception would be if a swarm could be made to loiter nearby in some safety while the operator selects and flies one after another into targets. I dunno; this is outside my knowledge.
Two guys with rifles sitting in a trench vs 2 guys with a dozen or more drones and a shift to use them, who will kill more Russians in the opposing positions?

Assume these guys can put the receiver and transmitter antennas up on a 30-foot pole away from their position, (not hard to do) for better range... You use the same transmitter and just bind it to the new drone as you fire them up and setup the video channel then yer good to go, no GPS required, this is seat of yer pants flying WW1 style. Hopefully the guys with the Mavic drones and nice cameras have spotted your targets for you before ya ever take off.

 

printer

Well-Known Member
they do have controllers that can pilot up to ten units in a swarm, i saw a video about it, maybe DIY posted it? i can't remember, but if they have shifts of 100 operators running swarms of 10 each, and as soon as they hit their targets, the next shift steps in, they could easily run nonstop until they ran out of drones.
I'm sure the Ukrainians will run clouds of smaller, cheaper, poorly armed drones to absorb AA fire first, then send in the good stuff.
I'd sure like to see that, from a safe distance.

 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
they're getting jets, they're getting new tanks, they're getting lots of ammo... :)
Winning battles is about concentrating force at the right point and time, breaking through and then exploting it by rampaging in the enemy rear and cutting off forces at the front. Having an enemy with piss poor, training, equipment, morale, and communications that you can spoof helps a lot, so does excellent intelligence. The Ukrainians have short internal lines of communications in the east and south and can move large forces to several fronts overnight with high mobility and lots of road transport. The Russians have to take the long way around by train, they might have a few hundred thousand men, but how many are combat troops and how many can they move, concentrate and support in time to where the critical battle is being fought? It won't be a slog it will be a lightning strike without warning with a diversionary attack or even two attacks at once and they will be ready with territorials to exploit any gains they make. I wouldn't be surprised to see them drive the Russians into Crimea this summer and cut them off there and then take the entire east of the country right up to the borders. Whatever Vlad has in Crimea will be trapped there and unable to participate in the mainland battle.
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
I’m not sure the swarm is a useful feature if it’s a master/slave arrangement. Since a drone will ideally be expended on a vehicle or a tight cluster of enemy, I would think one per operator would work best. Adding automation would get very expensive, I believe.

The exception would be if a swarm could be made to loiter nearby in some safety while the operator selects and flies one after another into targets. I dunno; this is outside my knowledge.
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member

Kremlin 'finding it increasingly difficult to isolate' Russians from reality of its war on Ukraine

327,809 views Mar 15, 2023 #Russia #Ukraine #war
As Ukrainian and Russian forces battle for the city of Bakhmut, there is also a battle playing out in Russia for the hearts and minds of its citizens. So as Russia seeks a badly needed military breakthrough, they are finding it more and more challenging to control the narrative back home, explains Jaroslava Barbieri, Teaching Associate & ESRC-funded Doctoral Researcher on Russian Foreign & Security Policy in the post-Soviet region at the University of Birmingham.
 

abandonconflict

Well-Known Member
Friendship means telling hard truths about the endgame in Ukraine
The handwriting is on the wall. As extensively covered in these pages, the evolution of U.S. domestic politics — as indicated in critical commentary from prominent political figures by no means limited to the right wing of the Republican Party — makes it increasingly clear that President Biden’s policy of robust, largely unconditional military and financial support of Ukraine cannot, and probably should not, be sustained.

To give Gov. Ron DeSantis (R-Fla.), Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif) and other naysayers their due, U.S. officials should never issue “blank checks” in support of any policy, save to counter an existential threat. Resources and risks must always be carefully calibrated in proportion to the genuine national interests at stake.

Despite the foolishly narrow terms in which he has framed the issue, DeSantis is right: The Russian invasion of Ukraine, on its own, is no threat to U.S. national security. It is only when the issue is viewed more broadly, in the context of the continued aggressive Russian adventurism the sacrifice of Ukraine could incentivize — to say nothing of the demonstration effect which Ukraine’s conquest would register in Beijing — that we begin to assess the actual national security stakes involved. Even then, it would be hard to argue that the full defense of every inch of Ukrainian territory is absolutely vital to Western interests.

The shift in the U.S. political zeitgeist has surely not gone unnoticed in Kyiv, but neither should it be ignored by the Biden administration. Now is the time for the administration to engage in some hard critical thinking, followed by tough talk in Kyiv, in NATO capitals, and yes, in Moscow.
Although the stakes I dealt with were decidedly lower, the current situation puts me in mind of a mission I undertook 20 years ago in northern Iraq, just three months before the March 2003 U.S. invasion.

CIA’s robust pre-invasion intelligence campaign, which depended upon Iraqi Kurdish support for teams operating at considerable peril within the country, was at risk. Fearful that U.S. threats of war with Saddam might be nothing more than a bluff that would leave them vulnerable to vicious reprisals, Kurdish leaders were weighing whether to cut a new deal with Baghdad of the sort they had negotiated in the past, which would have worked heavily against our interests.

At the same time, the U.S. was actively trying to convince a reluctant Turkish government to allow the U.S. 4th Infantry Division to transit Turkey and invade Iraq from the north (while the main force moved up from Kuwait). Though the likelihood of Turkish permission was low, all anticipated that the price for Turkish cooperation, if it came, would be a U.S. agreement to allow Turkish forces to accompany the division into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, where the Turks would have their own agenda.

Despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds were fierce, avowed enemies of the Turks, no one in the George W. Bush administration thought to take them into confidence. That fell to CIA, and therefore, to me.

After providing Kurdish leaders the assurances they sought, I came to the bad news: If the Turks allowed the 4th Infantry Division to pass, they would insist on sending troops to accompany it. And if the Turks agreed, in effect, to join the U.S.-led coalition, the U.S. could not say no.
Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani responded with expected truculence, saying his troops would shoot any Turkish troops that cross the border. I looked at him with feigned impassivity. “No,” I said evenly. “You won’t.”
I explained that Turkish troops, if it came to that, would not be transiting the border alone. “They will be with us,” I said. And if Kurdish Peshmerga forces engaged them, they would be considered defenders of Saddam by U.S. forces, and treated accordingly.

Though he was clearly unhappy, the rest of the conversation with Masoud was far more agreeable and constructive. That was only possible because Masoud knew throughout that he was dealing with a friend, one who had come not to threaten, but to do him the courtesy of telling him the unvarnished truth about a situation neither of us could avoid.

The time is fast approaching when a senior representative of the Biden administration will need to begin a similarly tough, realistic — and empathetic — dialogue with Zelensky. Biden is surely seen as a great friend in Kyiv. But his ability to deliver on his implicit and explicit promises of support for Ukraine “for as long as it takes” is likely to be curtailed in the near future. That’s something he can’t help. Now would be the time to begin to disabuse Zelensky of the notion that he can count on unqualified U.S. and Western support for war aims that he sets unilaterally.

Specifically, Zelensky must be pushed in the direction of a negotiated solution, likely to include territorial concessions on Crimea and the Donbas. That would be admittedly unpalatable, to say the least. In a just world, it would be a non-starter. But in an American political environment that is increasingly focused on core U.S. interests, which include the maintenance of Ukraine as a bulwark again further Russian encroachment on Europe, it must also be acknowledged that not all of Ukraine is necessary to meet that goal. The offset, and the concomitant to a policy focused on European security, would be the extension to Ukraine of a far more explicit and permanent NATO security arrangement, probably ending in full NATO membership and Article 5 security guarantees.

The latter, of course, will surely be unacceptable to Russia. But in the end, Putin will have to accept that these are the wages of sin, the inevitable result of a disastrous miscalculation. He cannot expect that NATO will maintain something like the status quo ante in terms of its expansion, when he has gone so far as demonstrating that the possible eventuality which NATO’s post-cold-war continuation was designed to forestall is, in fact, not a hypothetical but a clear and present danger. His alternative will be to risk utter, humiliating defeat.

The U.S. point to him could be reinforced by an agreement to provide Ukraine with advanced American fighter aircraft. The agreement would be purely symbolic for some time to come, as such aircraft cannot be immediately absorbed by a Ukrainian air force lacking the necessary training and logistics. But the short-term political symbolism and the long-term threat to Putin’s strategy of attrition could be telling.

That is not to suggest for a moment that the U.S. should engage in negotiating Ukraine’s future. Kyiv is not Kabul, and cannot be treated as such. Ukraine will make its own sovereign decisions regarding war aims. But Zelensky will need to understand, given his near-abject dependence on Western support, that there will be limits on the aspirations the West will support, and therefore on what he can legitimately hope to achieve.

A nation once seen as hopelessly corrupt and tied only tenuously to Western values, Ukraine has become an international symbol of freedom, democracy and principled resistance to aggression. Anyone involved in dealing with Ukraine on behalf of the U.S. cannot be unmoved by that. But politics and geography are real. Neither Ukraine nor we can help that it shares a long border with a large, powerful and paranoid neighbor. Ukraine’s friends and supporters have interests that will eventually overshadow their affections, and their resources are finite.

Just as I was called upon to do in northern Iraq 20 years ago, that is the message which can and must be conveyed by a true friend in Kyiv.
Robert Grenier served for 27 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, ending his career as director of the CIA CounterTerrorism Center, responsible for all CIA counter-terror operations around the globe. He is the author of “88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary.”

Food for thought.
whatever...

I say continue that proxy war. Serves em righ for putting bounties on US troops in A-stan. Let their 5'7" neo-czarist shitstain leader Putito squander his nation. It doesn't really cost that much in comparison to having the US military deployed. Beesides, Russia started it, hey invaded Ukraine.
 

DIY-HP-LED

Well-Known Member
China does not want nukes deployed beyond national borders because it doesn't want to be ringed by American nukes deployed in allied countries surrounding it. So, it's a bad idea for Russia to deploy nukes in Belarus as far as Xi is concerned, considering past agreements. Xi just had a big pow wow with the central Asian countries, former Soviet republics, right after Vlad's meeting too, and they have railroads there and soon pipelines. It looks like China is taking over central Asia and has its eye on current Russian autonomous republics in the far east, in case Russia dissolves one day.

The EU and America are just gonna use Ukraine to make the Russians feel the pain and destabilize Belarus politically. Vlad has large internal security forces there, but they might be needed in Russia or other places because when Ukraine is done the Russian army won't exist, except on paper. If they start taking out Russian rail bridges, the ones leading into Belarus from Russia should be on the list too, weaken the links between them and include road bridges too.

If America or Europe won't or can't supply the means to do this, then the Ukrainians must come up with a home-grown solution of drones, converted aircraft to drones or missiles. It is a way to decisively deal with the Russians and keep them out long term, by focusing on destroying vital rail bridges inside Russia with precision strikes. The railways are the Russian military's weak link in this age of precision munitions, and they can be effectively struck from hundreds of miles away. Rail lines can be repaired in hours and the Russians are good at it with specialized railway units, but rail bridges and via ducts are another matter and take months to repair and if a lot are hit over a short period of time, then there will be a bottle neck for materials and equipment. Russia would have to deploy tens of thousands of troops to try and defend them and have to use any air defense assets they have doing it too and many of those bridges are in the middle of nowhere.

So, nukes in Belarus leads to escalation, well one way to escalate is by giving them means ATCMS and cruise missiles, or aid in a home-grown solution to destroying Russian rail bridges inside Russia. Perhaps at the right time, when enough of the Russian army and their equipment has been destroyed or trapped in Ukraine.

 

CCGNZ

Well-Known Member
A regular comparisson over the past year, hopefully originally not intended to suggest Russia’s economy is a ‘small’ as Italy’s. What usually isn’t mentioned is that the national debt of Italy is over 130%. They need billions injected by the EU to remain the 10th largest economy while constantly being in an economic crisis. The reason they get it is their economy and debt being so large the EU can’t let it collapse. Russia’s national debt is only a 6th of that of Italy’s.
Good point,Italy has always been a EU weak link,it's about doing jujitsu w/the books or putting lipstick on a pig,this is not to disparage Italians as a people or their interesting culture.It's just the chaos thay prevails in their dizzying political realm makes it hard for Italy to gain any steam w/progress before a no confidence vote dismantles the govt.. Endless infighting and coalitions formed w/strange bedfellows seem to make Italy incapable of staying in a lane to even gage progress before it's all torn back down,much to the chagrin of fellow EU countries.
 
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